Introduction
The international diffusion of technologies for mitigating climate change is at the core of current discussions surrounding the post-Kyoto agreement. Technology development and diffusion are considered strategic objectives in the 2007 Bali Road Map. North-to-south technology transfer is of particular interest since technologies have been developed mostly in industrialized countries and that technologies are urgently required to mitigate GHG emissions in fast-growing emerging economies. A recent study looking at patents filed in thirteen climate change mitigation technologies shows that two-thirds of the inventions patented worldwide between 1998 and 2003 have been developed in only three countries: Japan, the USA, and Germany (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2009 ).
However, enhancing technology transfer involves considerable policy and economic challenges because developing countries are reluctant to bear the financial costs of catching up alone, while firms in industrialized countries refuse to give away strategic intellectual assets. This has led to an intense debate on policies that affect technology diffusion, with a particular focus on the role of intellectual property rights (IPRs) that developing countries view as barriers to technology diffusion.
By contrast, industrialized countries advocate that IPRs provide innovators with incentives to disseminate their inventions through market channels, such as foreign direct investment and the international trade of equipment goods. In their view, every developing country could actually promote transfers by developing its capability to absorb new technologies. This paper examines these issues by identifying the factors that promote or hinder the international diffusion of climate-friendly technologies. We focus the analysis on the most relevant questions in current policy discussions. First, is the capacity of countries to absorb foreign technologies important? If the answer is in the affirmative, this implies that capacity building is a powerful lever to technology transfer. Do strict IPRs induce more transfers? Do barriers to trade or to foreign direct investment significantly reduce the import of technologies? Has the Kyoto Protocoland the related domestic policies-accelerated technology diffusion?
We address these questions using a data set of climate-related patents filed in 66 countries from 1990 to 2003. The data come from the World Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT). We focus the analysis on twelve technologies: six renewable energy technologies (wind, solar, geothermal, ocean energy, biomass, and hydropower), waste-to-energy, methane destruction, energy conservation in buildings, climate-friendly cement, motor vehicle fuel injection, and energy-efficient lighting.
Although not all climate-friendly technologies are covered-they represent around 33% of all GHG abatement opportunities up to 2030, excluding forestry (McKinsey and Vattenfall, 2007 )-they concern very diverse sectors such as electricity and heat production, the manufacturing industry, and the residential sector.
The literature dealing with the international diffusion of environment-related technology is limited but is growing rapidly 1 . Unlike the present work, this literature is mostly descriptive. Lanjouw and Mody (1996) presented the first patent-based empirical evidence for the international diffusion of environmentally responsive technology. Based on data from Japan, Germany, the USA, and fourteen developing countries, the paper identifies the leaders in environmental patenting and finds that significant transfers occur to developing countries. Focusing on chlorine-free technology in the pulp and paper industry, Popp et al. (2007) provide evidence that environmental regulation may promote international technology transfer. They observe for instance an increase in the number of patents filed by US inventors in Finland and Sweden after passage of tighter regulations in these countries. Several case studies discuss whether stricter patent protection promotes or hinders the transfer of climaterelated technology to developing countries (see, for example, Barton, 2007; Ockwell et al., 2008) .
Finally, we recently used PATSTAT data to describe the geography of innovation and international technology diffusion (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2009 ).
To the best of our knowledge, our work is one of the first econometric studies in this area.
Another very recent work is by Dekker et al. (2009) who study how sulfur protocols trigger invention and diffusion of technologies for reducing SO2 emissions. A paper by Hascic and Johnstone (2009) is the most closely related to our work. They use the same data to study the impact of the Kyoto protocol. Our focus is different since we deal with a broader set of policy variables (including trade barriers, FDI control, etc.). Moreover, we develop a theoretical model to cope with simultaneity problems neglected in the other papers.
As a measure of diffusion, our approach is similar to that of Mody (1996), Eaton and Kortum (1999) , or Hascic and Johnstone (2009 This approach appears similar to the method based on patent citation analysis used in many studies seeking to measure the extent of international knowledge flows (see Jaffe et al., 1993; Peri, 2005) . But there is an important difference. Inventors obviously patent abroad to reap private benefits.
Therefore, while citations made by inventors to previous patents are an indicator of knowledge spillovers, our indicator is a proxy for market-driven knowledge flows.
The study is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the use of patents as indicators of technology transfer. The data set is presented in Section 3 along with data issues. In Section 4 we develop a theoretical model that describes the diffusion of inventions between countries. The model is estimated in Section 5. A final section summarizes the main results. This is why more recent papers tend to rely on patent data. 2 Patent data focus on outputs of the inventive process (Griliches, 1990) . They provide a wealth of information on the nature of the invention and the applicant. Most important, they can be disaggregated to specific technological areas.
Patents as indicators of technology transfer
Finally, they indicate not only the countries where inventions are made, but also where these new technologies are used. These features make our study of climate change mitigation technologies possible. Of course, patent data also present drawbacks, which will be discussed below.
To accurately explain how we use patent data in this paper, we must briefly recall how the patent system works. Consider a simplified innovative process. In the first stage, an inventor from country i develops a new technology. He then decides to patent the new technology in certain countries. A patent in country j grants him the exclusive right to commercially exploit the innovation in that country. Accordingly, the inventor patents his invention in country j if he plans to use it there.
The set of patents protecting the same invention in several countries is called a patent family.
In this paper we use the number of patents invented in country i and filed in country j as an indicator of the number of innovations transferred from country i to country j. As mentioned in the introduction, this indicator has already been used in previous work (see, for instance, Lanjouw and Mody, 1996; Eaton and Kortum, 1999) . It differs, however, from those indicators that are based on backward patent citation and are used in the literature measuring knowledge spillovers (see Jaffe et al., 1993) .
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Our approach is obviously imperfect. The first limitation is that for protecting innovations, patents are only one of several means, along with lead time, industrial secrecy, or purposefully complex specifications (Cohen et al., 2000; Frietsch and Schmoch, 2006) . In fact, inventors may prefer secrecy to avoid the public disclosure of the invention imposed by patent law, or to save the significant fees attached to patent filing. However, there are very few examples of economically significant inventions that have not been patented (Dernis and Guellec, 2001) , although the propensity to patent differs between sectors, depending on the nature of the technology (Cohen et al., 2000) and the risk of imitation in a country. These factors behind the propensity to patent have a significant effect on our data, because patenting is more likely in countries that have strong technological capabilities and that strictly enforce intellectual property rights. However, we will see that the econometric models developed below partly control for this problem.
More generally, certain forms of knowledge are not patentable. Know-how or learning-bydoing, for example, cannot be easily codified, particularly because these are skills incorporated in individuals. The nature of such knowledge limits the accuracy of our data. Nevertheless, research
shows that flows of patented knowledge and of tacit knowledge are positively correlated (Cohen et al., 2000; Arora et al., 2008) .
A further limitation is that a patent grants the exclusive right to use the technology only in a given country; it does not mean that the patent owner will actually do so. This could significantly bias our results if applying for protection did not cost anything, so that inventors might patent widely and indiscriminately. But this is not the case in practice. Dechezleprêtre et al. (2009) show that the average invention is patented in two countries. 4 Patenting is costly, in both the preparation of the application and the administration associated with the approval procedure (see Helfgott, 1993; and Berger, 2005, for EPO applications). In addition, possessing a patent in a country is not always in the inventor's interest if that country's enforcement is weak, since the publication of the patent in the local language can increase vulnerability to imitation (see Kortum, 1996 and 1999) . Therefore, inventors are unlikely to apply for patent protection in a country unless they are relatively certain of the potential market for the technology covered. Finally, because patenting protects an invention only in the country where the patent is filed, inventors are less likely to engage in strategic behavior to protect their inventions abroad and prevent the use of their technology in the production of goods imported by foreign competitors in their domestic markets.
In addition to the above limitations, the value of individual patents is heterogeneous and its distribution is skewed: Since many patents have very little value, the number of patents does not perfectly reflect the value of innovations. This problem is probably less acute in this paper than in other works, as we focus on international diffusion. Exported technologies are of the highest value and make up only about a quarter of all inventions (Lanjouw et al., 1998 
Waste
Solid fuels based on waste; recovery of heat from waste incineration; production of energy from waste or waste gasses; recovery of waste heat from exhaust gases.
Wind Wind motors; devices aimed at controlling such motors.
Patent applications related to climate change are identified using the International Patent Classification (IPC) codes, developed at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). 6 We identify the IPC classes corresponding to the climate mitigation technologies in two alternative ways.
First, we search the descriptions of the classes online to find those that are appropriate. 7 Second, using the online international patent database maintained by the European Patent Office, 8 we search patent titles and abstracts for relevant keywords. The IPC classes corresponding to the patents that come up are included, provided their description confirms their relevancy.
When building the data sets, two possible types of error may arise: irrelevant patents may be included or relevant ones left out. The first error happens if an IPC class includes patents that bear no relation to climate mitigation. To avoid this problem, we carefully examine a sample of patent titles for every IPC class considered for inclusion, and exclude those classes that consist of patents unrelated to climate change mitigation. Key technologies involved with carbon reduction potential, therefore, are outside the scope of this study, which means that electric vehicles, energy efficient technologies in industry, or clean coal technologies are not part of our study.
The second error-relevant inventions are left out-is less problematic. We can reasonably assume that all innovations in a given field behave in a similar way and hence our data sets can be seen at worst as good representations of innovative activity in the field considered. Overall innovative activity may be underestimated, however, and may thus be less reliable than trends.
The definitions of the IPC codes used to build the data sets can be found in Annex 1. Further details on data construction can be found in Dechezleprêtre et al. (2009) . In addition to climate-friendly patents, other data are also used, in particular in order to describe the demand for technology. These data are described in section 5.
Theoretical framework
We now present a model that we use to specify estimation equations in the next section. We seek to explain cross-border knowledge flows. The ideal structural model would therefore account for the interplay between inventors and technology adopters as well as for the dynamics of innovation and diffusion, since inventors arguably anticipate diffusion outcomes when they define their innovation strategy. The model could then simultaneously determine innovation and diffusion outcomes. Such a comprehensive approach was developed, for instance, by Eaton and Kortum (1999) . But econometric estimation requires much data-for instance, on R&D expenditures-that are not available in our case given the broad geographical scope of our study and its focus on climate technologies.
Alternatively, we could estimate gravity-like models such as those frequently used in the literature about knowledge spillovers. The micro-foundations of this approach are weak, however.
This is probably not a serious limitation when dealing with the spillover type of knowledge flows: The mechanisms through which diffusion occurs-e.g., labour mobility-are not driven by the market for technologies, and inventors who own the technologies do not play an active role, as they derive no profits from diffusion. But using a gravity model is more problematic in our case because we seek to explain intentional technology transfer through the market. countries. The ultimate goal of our study is to explain n ijt , which denotes the number of inventions invented in country i and adopted in another country j (i ≠ j) in year t. The problem is that competition between technologies in the recipient country j implies that n ijt is influenced by inventions provided by local inventors, n jjt , and by inventions imported from other foreign countries n kjt (k ≠ i, j). As a result, the n ijt , n jjt and n kjt are jointly determined. Our model aims to solve this simultaneity problem.
Consider first the adopters. Let U jt be the aggregate utility of all adopters located in country j.
We adopt a Cobb-Douglas functional form 9 :
The utility depends on the number of technologies transferred from the different foreign countries and on the number of technologies locally invented. Note that we make the simplifying assumption that all foreign inventions exhibit the same elasticity. K jt is the stock of knowledge accumulated in the recipient country. This captures the usual view in the literature on technology diffusion that accumulated knowledge increases the ability to exploit new technologies. D jt is a variable capturing factors affecting the demand for technology in the recipient country. Finally, a i , with i = 1,..4 are coefficients that do not vary over time and across countries. Furthermore, we impose 0 < a i < 1 so that U increases with the demand factors while marginal utility is decreasing.
Turning next to the supply side, innovators of country i can commercially exploit their technologies in country j at unit cost C ijt . This is an implementation cost which captures factors that are specific to the recipient country, such as the strictness of the intellectual property regime and transfer costs hindering the international trade of technology (such as tariffs when the technology is embodied in an intermediate good, geographical distance, or linguistic barrier).
For the sake of simplicity, we assume away any inefficiency in the market for technology.
Such an assumption can be justified with the argument that the inventor of a particular technology is a monopolist who can perfectly discriminate technology adopters. 10 This assumption implies that the overall allocation of technologies is socially efficient. 11 It simplifies the analysis by allowing us to focus on the social welfare maximization program:
We solve this program in Annex 2, leading to
Proposition The number of technologies invented in country i and subsequently transferred in country j at time t is given by:
where
Proof. See Annex 2.
The reduced-form equation (2) will serve as a basis for our econometric equation. It gives an expression of the flow of inventions between country i and country j as a function of the exogenous variables. The LHS does not include the endogenous variables n jjt and Πn kjt that are simultaneously determined with n ijt through competition on the technology market. In fact, the potential for substitution between technologies imported from country i and the domestic inventions of country j is captured by the variable C jjt : as α 3 is positive, the higher the implementation cost of local technologies, the greater the number of technologies imported from country i ≠ j. The variable ΠC kjt plays a similar role and controls for the substitutability with technologies from countries k ≠ i, j.
Empirical issues
We have constructed a panel data set for each of the 12 technology fields described in Section 3. This is a strong point of our study: Estimating the model on each field allows us to control for technology-specific factors. The panels extend over 14 years, from 1990 to 2003. The final samples include between 2,176 and 3,181 country pairs over that period.
Estimation equations
A practical problem in estimating equation (2) is that we do not observe the number of inventions transferred but rather the patent flow between country i and country j. There are differences between these variables for the two reasons mentioned earlier. First, the number of patents that are granted for a given innovation varies significantly across countries. A common illustration is Japan,
where the "amount" of technology covered by a patent-referred to by IPR experts as the patent breadth-is said to be particularly low. For example, the same wind turbine covered by one patent in Germany may require three patents in Japan. Second, patenting is not the only way to protect innovation, and the propensity to patent varies across sectors and countries.
To tackle these problems, we follow Peri (2005) and Branstetter (2001) by assuming that the patent flow P ijt is such that:
In this expression, Φ j is an observed fixed factor which measures patent breadth in country j.
We will explain later how this variable is constructed. In contrast, e γ jt is an unobserved random term reflecting the propensity to patent inventions in country j at time t.
We then substitute (2) in (3), take the logs on both sides, adopt new notations, and add time dummies to control for potential endogeneity due to transitory shocks. This leads to the model we will estimate:
where lower case letters denote the logs of the initial variables. We allow the error term in (4) to contain γ jt , the random term capturing the unobserved propensity to patent, a country-pair specific component and random time-varying effects such that
where the latter term is assumed to be a normal iid disturbance.
Variable description
PATSTAT only yields information on P ijt . We do not have readily available data on absorptive capacities k jt , the implementation costs c ijt with i,j = 1,..M, the demand variable d jt , and the patentbreadth variable φ j = ln Φ j . For these variables, we will use a linear combination of different proxies, which we now describe in turn.
The recipient country's absorptive capability k jt :
We seek to understand whether transferring a technology requires generic skills and/or technology-specific knowledge. This leads us to use two different proxy variables to describe local technological knowledge. The first variable is S jt-1 , the discounted stock of previously filed patents in the technology at date t-1 by local inventors in the recipient country j. This is an indicator of the local absorptive capabilities that are specific to each technology. Following Peri (2005) , the patent stock is calculated using the perpetual inventory method. We initialize patent stocks for the year 1978 and use the recursive formula
where P jjt is the number of patented technologies invented by domestic inventors in year t. The value chosen for δ, the depreciation of R&D capital, is 10%, a value commonly used in most of the literature (see Keller, 2002) . 12 Note that using S jt-1 -i.e., lagging the variable by one year to predict transfers in year t given the stocks in year t-1-eliminates the potential problem of endogeneity.
The second proxy variable is edu jt , the tertiary gross enrollment ratio, which is the average percentage of the population of official school age for tertiary education actually enrolled in this level over the previous 10 years. Maskus, 2000; Smith, 2001; and Barton, 2007 Finally, one can reasonably assume that filing a patent in a country where the same language is spoken reduces transaction costs. Indeed, the applicant saves translation costs, and national legal systems are likely to be closer. Therefore, language ij is a dummy variable which equals 1 if both countries share a common official language and 0 otherwise.
The implementation cost

The demand for climate change technologies d jt
We use three variables that are common to all technologies: gdp_per_capita jt , pop jt, 16 and kyoto jt.
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The first one describes country j's per capita GDP in PPP USD, the second one is the log of its population, and the last one is a dummy variable equal to one if t > 1997 and if country j is an Annex 1 country that has ratified the Kyoto Protocol. We also use technology-specific demand variables, which are listed in Table 2 . The patent breadth variable φ j
We computed patent breadth coefficients in a previous study (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2009 ). That strategy consists in analyzing so-called international patent families that include patents protecting a given technology in several countries. By doing so, we found, for instance, that on average, one patent filed at the European Patent Office (EPO) translates up to 1.4 patent when the same technology is patented at the Japanese patent office. Setting the weight of applications at the EPO to unity, we calculated patent breadth coefficients Φ j for every patent office included in the PATSTAT database.
These coefficients are available in Dechezleprêtre et al. (2009) . We use φ j =log Φ j in this study.
Other econometric issues
A notable feature of our data is that most patents are only filed in one country (usually, the inventor's country), implying that the patent flow between two countries in a given year frequently equals zero. As shown in Table 4 , the proportion of zeros in the data sets ranges from 68% to 81%, depending on the technology. Therefore, the use of OLS may generate inefficient estimates. The
Poisson distribution would be too restrictive, as it imposes a mean that is equal to the variance. In our case, the data are highly over dispersed with a sample variance that is on average 10 times greater than the mean. For this reason, we use a negative binomial regression model, which tests and corrects for over-dispersion. Following Branstetter (2001), we run the regressions with the number of patents P ijt as the dependent variable. 
Results
We report the results in Tables 3a and 3b . Estimates across technologies are relatively stable, although there are some differences, which we will discuss below. We focus the interpretation on six policy-relevant questions.
1) Does accumulated knowledge facilitate the import of technology?
The local stock of technology-specific knowledge S jt-1 has a positive impact on the flows of patents in 11 regressions out of 12. The coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.1% level. There is no doubt that patent transfers increase if the recipient country is actively involved in R&D in the same technology field.
In contrast, the recipient country's level of education is statistically significant and has a positive impact only in five regressions. This suggests that generic absorptive capabilities are less important than technology-specific knowledge.
Counter to an intuitive assessment of the situation, the impact of higher technology-specific knowledge stock is negative in buildings insulation technologies. A possible explanation is that high technological capabilities imply strong imitation capacities, which lead some innovators to refrain from introducing new technologies in the recipient country.
2) Do strict intellectual property rights promote technology transfer? As mentioned earlier, this issue is very high in the political agenda. Our results suggest a positive influence of strict IP rights on technology transfer. More precisely, this result holds in 7 regressions out of 12. Exceptions are three renewable energy technologies (ocean energy, hydro power, and geothermal energy), as well as methane destruction and cement, on which IP rights have no statistically significant impacts.
When IPR strictness has a significant positive effect, part of the induced patenting could also reflect a substitution between patented and non-patented knowledge flows, rather than additional technology flows.
3) Do restrictions on international trade hinder technology transfer?
Restrictions to trade seem to be more important than IPR strictness: Higher tariff rates have a statistically significant negative impact on patent flows in 11 regressions. This result is confirmed by the fact that being part of the same trade bloc significantly increases patent flows in seven regressions. This suggests that transferred technologies are frequently incorporated in equipment goods.
4) Do restrictions on foreign direct investments hinder technology transfer? Stricter
international capital control has a statistically significant positive effect in seven regressions. This is clearly counter-intuitive. Several factors may explain this result, involving either a real effect on technology transfers or simply an increased use of patents as a means to secure these transfers. We do not know the precise contents of FDI regulations in the different countries, since we use a synthetic index developed by the World Economic Forum, but in some cases FDI control may directly aim at promoting the transfer of technology through foreign investments. More generally, it is likely that regulations increase the risk of losing control of transferred technology, 18 thus pushing foreign investors to rely more heavily on patents as a way to secure their intellectual assets. A final interpretation could be that restrictions on FDI tend to shift technology transfer to other channelssuch as licensing to local users-that are more patent-intensive than FDI.
5) Has the Kyoto Protocol accelerated the diffusion of climate-related technology?
The variable kyoto has a statistically significant positive impact on patent flows in 4 regressions over 12.
This suggests that the impact of domestic policy measures related to the protocol is differentiated across technologies.
Consider first the renewable energy technologies. It appears that the protocol has had an impact on three technologies-ocean, solar and geothermal technologies-that have a large potential for energy generation but that are still at an early stage of their technology development and commercial deployment. The potential for further development of these technologies contrasts with more mature technologies, such as hydropower, wind power, biomass energy, for which the kyoto dummy is not statistically significant.
The kyoto variable also has a statistically significant positive impact on the diffusion of motor vehicle fuel injection, which suggests that the transfer of this technology is particularly responsive to public policies.
Other variables
Demand variables are either not significant or exhibit the expected signs. For instance, the cloud coverage in the recipient country reduces the number of solar technologies that are imported. The transfer of fuel-injection technologies increases with gasoline prices and with number of cars. The production of renewable electricity promotes the import of renewable energy technologies (see elec_renew, elec_biomass, elec_hydro), etc.
As expected, technology flows fall as geographic distance increases and rise if both countries speak the same language. The recipient country's size (pop) and economic wealth (GDP_percapita) also promote the importation of technologies.
Finally, the control variable Σdistance has the expected positive impact in many regressions: the longer the geographical distance between the recipient country j and the technology providers from countries k≠ i, j, the larger the transfer from country i. Similarly, the higher the number of countries speaking the same language among countries k≠ i, j (captured by Σlanguage), the less the transfer from country i. The only potential problem concerns Σtrade_bloc, which should have a negative impact but is actually statistically positive in eight regressions. A likely explanation is that
Σtrade_bloc is a proxy variable for the overall trade openness of the recipient country.
Conclusions
In this paper we use the PATSTAT database to analyze the international diffusion of patented inventions in twelve climate-related technologies between 1990 and 2003. This allows us to draw conclusions about those factors which promote or hinder international technology transfer.
Regressions show that absorptive capacities of recipient countries are determinant factors. This is particularly true for technology-specific knowledge, whereas the general level of education exerts less influence.
We are also able to assess the impacts of different policy barriers. The results stress that restrictions to international trade-e.g., high tariff rates-and lax intellectual property regimes negatively influence the international diffusion of patented knowledge. In addition, results suggest that, unexpectedly, barriers to Foreign Direct Investments promote technology transfer in those cases where the coefficients are significant. This puzzle can have different interpretations. Perhaps strict FDI regulations include requirements of technology transfers. Another interpretation is that restrictions on FDI lead foreign technology owners to rely more systematically on patents, either to secure their FDI or as an alternative to it.
In conclusion, it is crucial to recall that patents are imperfect proxies of technology transfer for reasons explained in the paper. This should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. If the transfer of patented technologies is positively correlated with non-patented knowledge flows (e.g., know-how), our work gives a general view of the international diffusion of knowledge. Alternatively, if they are negatively correlated, because they are substitutes, our results only give a partial view of the overall picture. Further work is clearly necessary to clarify these points. Apparatus with means for collecting fermentation gases, e.g. methane C12M 1/107 Ocean power Tide or wave power plants E02B 9/08 Adaptations of machines or engines for special use-characterized by using wave or tide energy F03B 13/12-26
Mechanical-power-producing mechanisms-using pressure differences or thermal differences occurring in nature; ocean thermal energy conversion F03G 7/04-05
Water wheels F03B 7/00 Solar power Semiconductor devices sensitive to infra-red radiation, light, electromagnetic radiation of shorter wavelength, or corpuscular radiation and specially adapted either for the conversion of the energy of such radiation into electrical energy or for the control of electrical energy by such radiationadapted as conversion devices, including a panel or array of photoelectric cells, e.g. solar cells H01L 31/042-058
Generators in which light radiation is directly converted into electrical energy H02N 6/00 Aspects of roofing for energy collecting devices-e.g. including solar panels E04D 13/18 Use of solar heat, e.g. solar heat collectors; Receivers working at high temperature, e.g. solar power plants; having lenses or reflectors as concentrating elements F24J 2/06-18 Devices for producing mechanical power from solar energy F03G 6/00-06 Use of solar heat; Solar heat collectors with support for article heated, e.g. stoves, ranges, crucibles, furnaces or ovens using solar heat F24J 2/02
Use of solar heat; solar heat collectors F24J 2/20-54 Drying solid materials or objects by processes involving the application of heat by radiation-e.g. from the sun F26B 3/28
Waste Solid fuels based on materials of non-material origin-refuse or waste C10L 5/46-48 Machine plant or systems using particular sources of energy-waste F25B 27/02 Hot gas or combustion-Profiting from waste heat of exhaust gases F02G 5/00- 
Annex 2. Proof of Proposition 1
By differentiating (1) with respect to n jjt , we obtain the following M first-order conditions: 
